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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Justice Schaefer calls for the same reasoning to be used in the states. This
writer's purpose as stated initially was to bring the entire problem of
forum non conveniens into clear focus. Prognostication as to the future
use of the doctrine is left to the reader.
APPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL GAMBLING
STAMP TAX LAW
Spurred by the Kefauver Crime Investigating Committee, Congress, in
the Revenue Act of 1951, enacted two tax laws on gambling. The first tax,
aimed at the bookmaker and lottery operator, is a ten per cent excise on all
wagers concerning sporting events or lotteries. The second law imposes a
special $50 per year occupational stamp tax on such persons.
When purchasing the occupational gambling tax stamp the person must
register with the Director of Internal Revenue and give certain informa-
tion including: (1) name and place of business (2) each place of business
where his gambling activity is carried on, and the names and places of resi-
dence of persons engaged in receiving wagers for him or on his behalf and
(3) the name and place of residence of each for whom he is receiving
wagers. The required information is made available for public inspection,'
which means available for the state police or the FBI. But the payment of
the tax does not exempt any person from criminal prosecution for viola-
tions of federal or state laws prohibiting such gambling activities.2 A fine
of $1000 to $5000 is provided for failure to pay either the wagering tax or
failure to purchase the $50 tax stamp.8 In addition, wilful violations are
punishable by a fine up to $10,000 and imprisonment up to five years.4
Even though Congressional committees defended the tax as a revenue
producing measure5 there is little dispute as to the real purpose of these
taxes-to discourage gambling and to facilitate the enforcement of state
criminal laws against gambling. It is obvious that from a practical stand-
point a tax which is designed to end the activity with respect to which it is
imposed cannot be said to be for the purpose of collecting revenue. How-
ever, in a somewhat similar situation in 1919, the Supreme Court upheld a
one dollar per year tax upon narcotic dealers though there were elaborate
ancillary provisions as to registration requirements and records. 6
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TAX
The federal gambling tax law places the professional gambler in a dilem-
ma. If he buys the tax stamp and provides the information required he will
1 Internal Revenue Code S S 3292, 3275. 8 Internal Revenue Code S 3294 (a).
2 Internal Revenue Code § 3297. 4 Internal Revenue Code § 3294(c).
5H.R. Rep. No. 586 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 54-55 (1951); Sen. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong.
1st Sess. 112-113 (1951). At that time annual revenue from the tax was estimated at
$400,000,000, but has only run about 1% of this figure.
0 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
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be subject to prosecution as a violator of state anti-gambling laws. On the
other hand, if he refuses to register, the sanctions of the federal statute be-
come operative. In short, he is damned if he does and damned if he does
not. It is not surprising then, that the bookmaker and lottery operator
immediately contested the constitutionality of the occupational tax stamp
in the federal courts.
The principal line of attack has been that the tax constitutes an invasion
by the Federal Government of the police powers reserved to the states by
the Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The taxpayer has also
claimed that the informational requirements of the federal wagering tax
necessitated disclosure of incriminating facts which contravened the Fifth
Amendment.
The tax was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Kahriger,7 decided in 1953. The decision arose on appeal from a
district court's ruling that the provisions contravened the Tenth Amend-
ment in that Congress was attempting to regulate the purely state matter of
gambling under the guise of a taxing statute. In reversing this decision the
Supreme Court held the occupational tax was a valid revenue measure;
that its ancillary registration requirements were reasonable provisions to
facilitate the collection of the tax; and that the information required in
registering was not a denial. of the privilege against self-incrimination by
the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court in resolving the Fifth Amendment problem pointed
out that the privilege has relation only to past acts, not to future acts that
may or may not be committed. The Court reasoned that if the defendant
wished to take wagers subject to excise taxes he must pay the tax and
register. In doing so he is not compelled to confess to acts already com-
mitted, but is merely informed by statute that in order to engage in the
business of wagering in the future he must fulfill certain conditions. In
supporting its stand on the gambling tax the majority through Justice
Reed said:
From the beginning of our government the courts have sustained taxes
although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which,
considered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to
realize by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment.8
An interesting side light on the Kahriger case occurred two years later
when Kahriger appealed his conviction. The court of appeals directed his
7 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
8 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). Also see: United States v. Sanchez,
340 U.S. 42 (1950); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Magnano v. Hamil-
ton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928); Hamption v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919);
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869);
License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462 (1866).
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acquittal. The court found that the trial court had convicted Kahriger of
wilful violations of the statute. This could not stand, the court asserted,
because he had failed to register in fear that he might incriminate himself
by answering some of the questions appearing on the registration form. At
the outset Kahriger had attempted to pay the tax but payment had been
refused unless he first register. The appellate court stated that while the
Supreme Court in 1953 had rejected the Fifth Amendment self-incrimina-
tion argument, three justices had dissented. Under these circumstances,
the court reasoned, "it cannot be said that Kahriger's attitude was un-
reasonable and therefore his refusal to register for the tax was not wilful."
This acquittal of Kahriger of course does not affect the constitutionality
of the federal gambling tax nor does it give any gambler in the future a
valid defense. The acquittal stands alone, applicable only to the special cir-
cumstances surrounding Kahriger, in that he was the first to question the
validity of the law.
SUPPLEMENTARY STATE LEGISLATION
After the Kahriger case some states passed supplementary legislation
using the federal gambling tax stamp as a basis of state prosecution. Flori-
da, for instance, passed a statute10 in 1953 which made the mere purchase
and possession of the gambling stamp prima facie evidence of violation of
the Florida gambling laws. The following year Florida sought to enjoin,
as a nuisance, an alleged lottery and bookmaking business. The state's only
evidence was the fact that the defendants had purchased a Federal Wager-
ing Occupational Tax Stamp and had paid the tax of ten per cent on their
gross income from gambling. But the state made no mention of the above
statute and the Florida court held that the mere purchase and possession of
a gambling tax stamp is not sufficient evidence to establish the main-
tenance of a gambling house." If the state had used the statute making
possession of the tax stamp prima facie evidence, its logical application
would have resulted in a conviction. However, it is probable that the
prosecution refrained from mentioning the statute in anticipation of the
case which only a few months later held the Florida statute unconstitu-
tional.12
After these two Florida holdings the natural question arose: What
weight should be placed upon the purchase and possession of the tax
stamp as evidence of gambling? At the time of the Florida decision there
were only four other cases in which the gambling tax stamp had been used
as evidence of violation of gambling laws. An Alabama case 1 had held
9 United States v. Kahriger, 210 F.2d 565 (1954). 10 Fla. Stat. (1953) § 849.051.
11 Boynton v. State, 75 So.2d 211 (Fla., 1954).
12Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So.2d 494 (Fla., 1954).
13 Griggs v. State, 37 Ala. App. 605, 73 So.2d 382 (1954).
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that a statute providing that the possession of a gambling tax stamp was
prima facie evidence of violation of state gambling laws was constitutional.
But the Florida decisions in declaring such a statute unconstitutional dis-
regarded this Alabama opinion.
There were also two Tennessee cases at the time of the Florida deci-
sions. One, decided in 1954, used as evidence, in addition to the gambling
stamp, the testimony of officers, defendant's confession, and wagering tax
returns. 14 The other Tennessee case, 15 and a more significant one, concerned
a Chattanooga city ordinance making it unlawful to possess a federal
gambling stamp. The ordinance was held constitutional. The court how-
ever emphasized the fact that it was a civil proceeding for violation of a
city ordinance.
An ordinance of this type held constitutional in Tennessee seems to
conflict with the federal wagering act.16 It appears to penalize one for
obeying the federal law. For instance, there are situations where one
might be in possession of a wagering tax stamp without having violated
other state or local gambling laws and also without any intent to gamble
in the state in the future. One might pay the tax and get the stamp in Ten-
nessee intending to go to Nevada. Or a philatelist, in pursuit of his hobby,
might acquire a wagering stamp for his collection.
The fourth case in existence at the time Florida held its prima facie
statute unconstitutional was an earlier Florida decision of 1953 which arose
prior to the passage of the Florida statute making the federal gambling tax
stamp prima facie evidence of gambling. The court held the federal
gambling tax stamp not sufficient in itself to show that the holder was a
gambler. 1 7
The Florida decisions and surrounding circumstances including the
above four cases made a situation similar to the Federal Liquor License
cases 60 years ago. The situation at that time involved the duty of the
accused to pay the special federal tax as a liquor dealer and obtain a federal
license. Such license then was admissible in evidence to show the main-
tenance of a state liquor nuisance. The probative value of such evidence
was determined in connection with all the other evidence in the case and
in the absence of a statute making possession of a license prima facie evi-
dence of guilt the mere issuance of such a license was not sufficient to sus-
tain a conviction.'
To summarize this anomalous situation, Florida first held that possession
14 Acklen v. State, 267 S.W.2d 101 (Tenn., 1954).
15 Deitch v. Chattanooga, 195 Tenn. 245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953).
16 Moline, Illinois has such an ordinance.
17 Rodriguez v. Culbreath 66 So.2d 58 (Fla., 1953).
18 Appling v. State, 88 Ark. 393, 114 S.W. 927 (1908); Peyton v. State, 83 Ark. 102, 102
S.W. 1110 (1907); Liles v. State, 43 Ark. 95 (1884).
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of a federal gambling tax stamp is not enough to sustain a conviction of
violating state gambling laws. Then the Florida legislature passed a statute
making the mere possession of the federal tax stamp prima facie evidence
of gambling. But, shortly thereafter the state prosecuted a gambler with-
out mentioning the state statute and the gambler was absolved. In a subse-
quent case the Florida prima facie statute was declared unconstitutional by
the Florida Supreme Court. These cases certainly are in strong agreement
against such prima facie statutes. But Alabama had already said such a
statute was constitutional and Tennessee upheld the same idea in the form
of a city ordinance.
Then, in 1955, the Florida Supreme Court unequivocally reiterated its
former position that the mere purchase and possession of a gambling tax
stamp was insufficient to convict on a lottery law violation:
[T]he payment of the tax by the defendant does not establish even prima
facie, the operation of a lottery. This, coupled with the absence of any direct
testimony that there had even been lottery operation in Orange County, makes
the State's case fall short of establishing the corpus delicti .... 19
RECENT FEDERAL INTERPRETATION
The federal wagering tax stamp was questioned once again on constitu-
tional grounds by a gambler in the District of Columbia when convicted
for failing to buy the stamp.20 Here the United States Supreme Court
asserted that nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from levying
a tax on the business of accepting wagers in the District of Columbia even
though another federal statute makes it a felony. Defendant argued that
the conviction in the Kabriger case upholding the constitutionality of the
taxing statute involved a state (Pennsylvania) gambling law. The Court
here held it did not make any difference if the gambling law making such
activity a felony was state or federal. Once again there were violent dis-
sents. Frankfurter repeated in essence his dissent in Kahriger stating: "[F] or
here we are concerned with a spurious use of the taxing power as a
means of facilitating prosecution of federal offenses. '21 Black, also dissent-
ing, indicated that "by paying the tax petitioner would be compelled to
supply evidence useful to convict him of a felony therefore against the
Fifth Amendment." 22 Black's statement was countered by the fact that
registration is voluntary under the occupational tax statute.
Since the constitutional provisions have been resolved, the bulk of
prosecutions under the federal taxing act never get beyond the district
courts. However, periodically, cases find their way into the courts of
appeals. All have resulted in convictions.2 3
19 Rowe v. State, 84 So.2d 709 (Fla., 1955). 21 Ibid., at 425.
20 Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955). 22 Ibid., at 424.
23 E.g. Hodges v. United States, 223 F.2d 140 (CA. 5th, 1955); Cagnina v. United
States, 223 F.2d 149 (CA. 5th, 1955); Sagonias v. United States, 223 F.2d 146 (C.A. 5th,
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A minor interpretation of the stamp tax occurred in 1955.24 Defendant
was convicted for failure to register and pay a gambler's stamp tax. But
here the defendant was not actually a "gambler," but what is known as a
"pick up man." In gambling parlance where a lottery is operated the
"writer" is the person who has the dealings with the gambling public, i.e.,
he is the newspaper stand operator who takes the dollar and gives a stub.
The "banker" is the principal for whom the wagers are accepted, i.e., the
boss. The "pick up man" runs between the boss and the newsstand oper-
ator. The Court of Appeals of the 5th Circuit held that the pick up man
was subject to the special wagering tax.
We think the employee who collected the wagers and delivered them to the
principal was as much a part of the business and as much involved in the
acceptance of the wagers as the persons who physically received them from
the patrons and was "engaged in receiving wagers" in the sense contemplated
by the statute.25
This decision was based on a treasury regulation relating to the wagering
tax statute purporting to include the pick up man among those subject to
the wagering tax.26
However, two years later in 1957, the Supreme Court completely re-
versed this case thereby nullifying the effect of the Treasury Regulation.
Here the Supreme Court pointed out that the wagering statute applied to
persons "engaged in receiving wagers" and it quoted with approval the
court of appeals' reasoning that there was a "very real difference be-
tween a wager and a record of a wagering transaction. It is the banking
record and not the wager which the pick-up man receives from the writer
and transmits to the banker. The pick up man no more receives wagers
than a messenger, who carries records of customer transactions from a
branch bank to a central office, receives deposits." Justice Burton dissent-
ing stated: "Registration of the pick up man aids the Government in
tracking these gambling operations to their headquarters and is essential to
the enforcement of the excise tax. Since the 'receiving wagers' phrase in
the registration provisions includes the pick up man, it must have the same
meaning in the identical provisions imposing the occupational tax."'27
1955) Ippolito v. United States, 223 F.2d 154 (C.A. 5th, 1955) Contreras v. United
States, 223 F.2d 149 (C.A. 5th, 1955); Sagonias v. United States, 223 F.2d 146 (C.A. 5th,
1955); Ippolito v. United States, 223 F.2d 154 (C.A. 5th, 1955); Contreras v. United
States, 213 F.2d 96 (C.A. 5th, 1954); Sulli v. United States, 213 F.2d 100 (C.A. 5th, 1954);
24 Sagonias v. United States, 223 F.2d 146 (C.A. 5th, 1955). 25 Ibid., at 148.
26Trea. Reg. 132 S 325.41. ex. 2 reads as follows: B operates a numbers game. He
has an arrangement with 10 persons, who are employed in various capacities, such as
bootblacks, elevator operators, news dealers, etc., to receive wagers from the public
on his behalf. B also employs a person to collect from his agents the wagers received on
his behalf. B, his 10 agents, and the employee who collects the wagers received on his
behalf are each liable for the special tax.
27 United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 361 (1957).
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CONCLUSION
The eight year history of the federal gambling tax had a shaky start but
was bolstered firmly by Kabriger, upholding its constitutionality. Then
a few states passed statutes providing that the mere possession of such a
stamp was prima facie evidence of gambling sufficient for a conviction.
After Florida's prima facie statute was declared unconstitutional by the
Florida Supreme Court the cases thereafter, both in Florida and in other
states, used the wagering tax stamp to support other evidence of gambling.
However, at least one city ordinance has been upheld where mere posses-
sion of the tax stamp was a violation.28 Even though the tax stamp and
prosecutions relating to its possession still extract venomous dissenting
opinions on constitutional grounds, it is firmly entrenched in our tax law.
Certainly, drastic changes are not imminent from court interpretation, so
any change will have to come from Congress.
Right or wrong, both the Congress and the courts have applied a
Machiavellian principle to suppress gambling under the guise of a revenue
measure. This method recalls the thoughts of Alexander Hamilton in
Federalist #12 where, after pointing out the revenues which could be de-
rived from a national tax on liquor, he added:
That article would well bear this rate of duty; and if it should tend to
diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally favorable to
the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals and to the health of society.
28 Deitch v. Chattanooga, 195 Tenn. 245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953).
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN ILLINOIS: ITS GROWTH
AND PROBABLE DEVELOPMENT
Since the recognition of the right of privacy' is very recent in Illinois,
only a handful of cases have been decided bearing on the subject. With the
exception of one class of cases (involving the right of privacy in regard to
the return and distribution of fingerprints and photographs of arrested
persons), the Illinois decisions involve the invasions of privacy by printed
items, rather than movies, 2 radio and television programs 3 and harassment
by debt collectors.4 Due to the lack of sufficient coverage of the subject by
1 The right of privacy is the right of the individual to be let alone or to lead a
secluded life, or to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public about matters with which the public is not necessarily con-
cerned. Schmuckler v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 116 N.E.2d 819 (Court Common Pleas Ohio
1953.)
2 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,297 Pac. 91 (1931).
a Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App.2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956).
4 Housh v. Peth, 99 Ohio App. 26, 135 N.E.2d 440 (1955). There the defendant in
attempting to collect a debt telephoned the plaintiff every day at home, for three
